The
close of the Second World War saw the rise of Arab nationalism, a
movement that promised to unite much of the Middle East around
independence and social advancement. The imposition of a Jewish
theocratic state in the midst of Arab homelands no doubt accelerated
this movement, as did later imperialist meddling such as the Suez
intervention of 1956.
Both
Nasserism and the Ba'ath Party were early vehicles of a growing
nationalism centered on an Arab identity. Nasser's engagement with
non-alignment in the Cold War, his secularism, his advocacy of land
reform and Egyptian socialism resonated with the Arab masses.
Similarly, the pan-Arab Ba'ath Party organized around unity,
independence, and socialism-- all with a decidedly secular tone.
Islam, rather than the basis for identity, was second to ethic
national identities that proudly offered Islam to the world as a gift
from the Middle Eastern peoples. This secular trend grew rapidly,
resulting in a unified United Arab Republic in 1958, a development
that was soon terminated by a coup in Syria.
Of
course there were counter trends, reactionary trends in the Arab
world that worked against the progressive, secular movement. Centered
on the oil-driven dynasties, these forces, frightened by Arab
nationalism, aligned themselves with the imperialists, and were
vigorously anti-socialist. They offered an ideology counter posing
rigid Islamic fundamentalism to secular nationalism. Of course their
Western partners shared their hostility and were eager to exploit
their influence and resources against Arab nationalism.
The
opportunities were forthcoming with the humiliating defeats of Arab
military power by the Israeli armed forces. Tarnished by these
defeats, afflicted with corruption, and covertly impaired by Western
and Israeli security services, the leaders of Arab nationalism began
to lose support among the Arab masses.
Israel
and its Western imperialist friends contrived a strategy of
encouraging fundamentalism and religious sectarianism as an
alternative to the Middle Eastern Enlightenment. Once the lightening
rod for Arab unity and secular progressivism, the Palestinian
Liberation Organization fell victim to this strategy when the
Israelis disparaged the leadership of Yasir Arafat, rebuffing his
concessions and mocking his weaknesses. At the same time, they sought
to vitalize the influence of the religious-based Hamas among
Palestinians. This strategy, like so many similar strategies,
backfired when Hamas launched the Intifada that struck back
effectively against the Israeli occupiers. Envisioned as a classic
divide-and-conquer maneuver, the courtship of Islamic fundamentalism
underestimated the deeply ingrained hostility to imperial intrigue.
It was one thing to undermine Arab unity and secularism, but quite
another to scorn Arab independence.
The
US embraced the same tactics in its support for Islamic
fundamentalism in Afghanistan. As an answer to the assumption of
power by a secular, anti-imperialist, socialist movement and its
support by the Soviet Union, the US, along with its Gulf allies,
raised, armed, and assisted a merciless, sectarian fundamentalist
insurgency openly contemptuous of the human rights that the West
pretends to cherish.
The
backfire-- or “blowback” as some have dubbed it-- came quickly
and often, culminating in the deadly coordinated attack on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon in September of 2001. Thousands of
innocent civilians in the US died because US policy makers, through
ignorance and irresponsibility, sponsored religious zealots against
the tide of democratic, secular, and progressive movements in the
Middle East. While the tactic succeeded in turning back the tide of
secularism in the Middle East, the tacticians failed to understand
that their erstwhile Islamist allies deplored imperial manipulation
as much as they hated secularism. In other words, they weren't the
dupes that their “masters” wanted them to be. As the
divide-and-conquer strategy collapsed, generating anti-Western
violence, the Western puppeteers could only react in panic:
“Terrorists!” The liberal apologists for this dangerous game
offered their own term of derogation: “Islamo-fascists!”
And
nothing was learned from the unholy alliance.
Once
again, policy makers thought they could ride the tiger of religious
sectarian intolerance and create a loyal satrapy to US interests. The
US fabricated outlandish excuses to invade Iraq in 2003, though not
so outlandish as to nonetheless seduce nearly the entire US
intelligentsia, as Frank Rich recently recounted in a nastily angry,
bitter article in New York magazine (The Stink of Baghdad,
June 2-8, 2014). Rich reminds us of the hysterical reaction to absurd
claims about the dangers supposedly latent in the regime of Saddam
Hussein.
Cobbled
together by League of Nations mandate, the British had established
the country as a semi-colonial kingdom that lasted until its
independence in 1958. Its brief life as a republic was afflicted with
internal ethnic, religious, and political divisions. Through brutal
repression of these many divisions, Hussein was able to establish a
reasonably stable country, a country to be counted as one of the most
outwardly secular in the Middle East at the time of the US's
unprovoked massive invasion.
With
the senseless slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, the
shearing of a fragile social fabric, and the wholesale destruction of
the country's infrastructure, the US invaders and their compliant
allies succeeded in sowing chaos and instability never before seen in
a land once celebrated as the cradle of civilization. Quite an
accomplishment for the twenty-first century super power heralding
itself as the paragon of democracy and human rights!
The
vandals could not leave without creating a mock democracy to
accompany a massive military and security apparatus constructed to
hold the bloody mess together. In 2006, the US vetted potential
leaders and permitted the Iraqi parliament to “choose” the
hand-picked prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. In the last week,
President Obama now wants to fire him; rather, he wants the
parliament to fire him and select another hand-picked prime minister.
This process passes for democracy, with the scribes populating the
major media in the US.
In
the last month, the massive military/security apparatus has crumbled
in the face of a well coordinated offensive by a ruthless, dedicated
band of zealots seemingly more welcome in some parts of Iraq than the
former invaders. The only thing that the warring factions in a once
stable country can agree upon is their animosity towards those who
pretended to liberate them from the Saddam Hussein regime.
It
is a supreme-- but cruel-- irony that a country with a tenuous hold
on nationhood, a country still barely beyond the legacy of
colonialism, a country enjoying a rare period of secular culture and
stability, was pushed back into barbarism and destructive
sectarianism by a supposedly enlightened, advanced country flexing
its muscles under the absurd banner of a “War on Terror.”
There
is not a Hall of Shame large enough to accommodate the talk-show
propagandists, witless syndicated columnists, and mindless news
anchors who cheer-leaded the Iraqi debacle; but surely Thomas
Friedman, the New York Times columnist, deserves a seat near
the front row. His enthusiasm and repeated mistaken projections of
final victory are well documented. One of his most recent columns
tells us that our attention should shift from the bloody
confrontation currently bringing death and displacement to Iraq to
the conflict of “the extremists vs. the environmentalists in the
Middle East” (The Real War of Ideas, NYT, 6-10-14).
Demonstrating his ignorance again and again, he announces that he has
uncovered the environmentalists' secret: “The environmentalists
think of this region [the Middle East] without borders...” He seems
to overlook the important fact that all of the existing borders are
largely irrational products of colonial governance, borders designed
to exploit tribal and religious animosities to the benefit of
colonial masters. For Friedman, history and context are nothing
weighed against his latest conversation in a whirlwind tour of a
region.
For
another journalistic scoundrel deeply implicated in the Iraq debacle,
we can turn to John Burns. In the words of Michael
Munk:
“As chief of the NYTimes
Baghdad bureau during much of the war, [John] Burns was a notorious
cheerleader for the invasion and occupation. He now blames his
failure to understand how 'deeply fractured' Iraqi society was. I
guess you failed to notice, John, that it wasn’t fractured before
the invasion, and as Naureckas
observers, 'Is it typical for countries to respond to unprovoked
military invasions by becoming strong, stable democracies?'”
Burns,
without a hint of contrition, now says: “I think the mistake we
made was–I'm talking here about myself as well as some of my
colleagues, not just at the New
York Times
but many publications–was not to understand how deeply fractured
that society was, how strongly held those animosities were, and how
they would not likely relent under any amount of American tutelage
and encouragement.” (quoted by Naureckas above)
This
is exactly the wrong conclusion to draw, a conclusion exposing
both dishonesty and servility to US government policy. Iraq was not,
as Munk reminds us, a fractured society until the US fractured
it.
Moreover,
Libya was not a fractured society, nor was Syria a fractured society,
until the US joined with others in fracturing them. It was no
coincidence that, like Iraq, both were among the most secular
countries in the Middle East with relatively high standards of
living, high educational levels, and developed social safety nets.
Today, Libya is largely ungoverned and ungovernable, a failed state.
And Syria is in the throes of an ugly civil war stoked by the US, EU,
and the Gulf states.
Put
simply and clearly, Iraq is not an honest mistake, as Burns would
have it, but an instance of a systematic, aggressive foreign policy
designed to divide and conquer the Middle East, a policy designed to
use religious fundamentalism and tribalism, formerly on the wane, as
an instrument against independence, nationalism, and social progress.
It is the foreign policy of imperialism.
It
is not only the policy of Bush, as Democratic Party stalwarts want us
to believe. It is not only the incompetence of Obama, as the Right
shouts. It is not the over-reach of super patriots or chicken hawks.
It is not only an arrogant, unrestrained military, as many pretend.
It is the willful, unwavering program of a US ruling class determined
to shape the Middle East to meet the interests of elites and
corporations in the US and with its allies.
The
failure to face this truth guarantees that the Iraqi debacle and many
more like it will bring shame to the self-styled democracies and the
hypocritical bastions of human rights.
Zoltan
Zigedy
1 comment:
I have worked on the Middle East for the past forty-plus years and I want to raise serious questions about your recent post about progressive Arab nationalism. When I first joined MERIP in 1975, there was a lot of enthusiasm among MERIPites for the muscular Arab nationalism of Nasser et al, but that faded quiickly in the following years. From the present perspective, we should not promote Arab nationalism because it was so glaringly limited in its approach to the political and social crisis of the times. Nationalism, after all, is not internationalism, nor is “Arab socialism” anything akin to the kind of socialism you would advocate.
These nationalists were prone to military dictatorships and discrimination against non-“Arab” citizens, among other things. The Baathists were especially nasty and in Iraq they cooperated with the CIA in murdering thousands of Communists, as is well-documented by the great Iraqi historian Hanna Batatu. It is not an accident that Saddam Hussein emerged as the main standard-bearer of Baathism and of course Hafez al-Assad in Syria was the other Baathist leader. These two “pan-Arab” demagogues were constantly in conflict with one another and did little to promote a unified Arab nationalist movement. Both emerged from military coups and relied to a considerable extent on the military. Their “parties” were never broad-based, except when they became paths of advancement in the service of the dictators. They persecuted the Kurds, pushing them into the hands of foreign benefactors like the US and Israel. Other minorities, notably Christians, felt persecuted as well. Communitarian differences among Muslims also were exacerbated.
Nasser was not as nasty, but he and his “free officers” ruled in an undemocratic fashion. They shocked the British by insisting on membership in the exclusive Jockey Club, a move that signified their wish to join the elite, not to change the social structure. They purged the Communists and forced out Jews who were the leaders of the left movements as well as most other “foreigners” who constituted the majority of the very diverse and international city of Alexandria. They were not tolerant enough of the very large Coptic minority. Etc. Sadat followed in the same path (he was also one of the free officers) and his intelligence services promoted the Muslim Brotherhood as a way to weaken the left. Mubarak was another in this tradition and so is Sisi.
So by all means, let us show how the US has promoted Islamic fundamentalism as a hammer against the left. But please let’s not idealize the discredited era of Arab Nationalism with all its glaring defects!
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