In the throes of the
2007-2008 economic collapse, I projected that the global economy
would be irrevocably and qualitatively marred by the unfolding
events. I foresaw a shift in the structure of international
relations, a shift away from the so-called “globalization”
interlude. Writing in November of 2008:
The
economic crisis has reversed the post-Soviet process of international
integration – so-called "globalization." As with the
Great Depression, the economic crisis strikes different economies in
different ways. Despite efforts to integrate the world economies, the
international division of labor and the differing levels of
development foreclose a unified solution to economic distress. The
weak efforts at joint action, the conferences, the summits, etc.
cannot succeed simply because every nation has different interests
and problems, a condition that will only become more acute as the
crisis mounts.
A crisis of the severity
of 2007-2008 understandably challenges some earlier verities, but
more importantly, it renders some economic roads now impassable. My
view was that the era of completely open, free, and secure
international exchange fueling dramatic growth in trade was not a new
stage of capitalism-- as many wished to argue-- but a phase created
by politically contingent factors and spurred by the intensified
international competition of the last thirty years of the twentieth
century. Moreover, that phase-- unhelpfully called “globalization”--
was both fortuitous and disastrous for the fate of capitalism. I
elaborated on this further in April of 2009:
To
simplify greatly, a healthy, expanding capitalist order tends to
promote intervals of global cooperation – enforced by a hegemonic
power – and trade expansion, while a wounded, shrinking capitalist
order tends towards autarky and economic nationalism. The Great
Depression was a clear example of heightened nationalism and economic
self-absorption. Most commentators acknowledge this fact, but
attribute it to the predilections of national leaders. It was said
that Roosevelt “sabotaged” the London Economic Conference, for
example. Earlier, he said: “Our international trade relations,
though vastly important, are in point of time and necessity secondary
to the establishment of a sound economy.” It is my contention, and
I believe essential to a Marxist understanding, that Roosevelt’s
reaction was an expression of the logic of capitalism under stress;
the structural development that led to intense nationalism throughout
Europe, especially in Germany and Italy, and ultimately to war.
The stress of the
2007-2008 economic collapse created “centrifugal forces,” forces
pulling apart the institutions, the regulations, and the commitment
to an open, unified, and universal global marketplace. In its place
would come a growing national partisanship, a commitment to
winning-against-adversaries, rather than partnership. This process of
“de-globalizing,” of going it alone would gain against both the
process and ideology of economic integration.
I believe these
projections have been borne out. My February, 2017 article
New Developments in Political Economy: The
Demise of “Globalization”, makes the case
that the trade internationalism of the post-Soviet era is in profound
decline. Moreover, emergent and growing nationalism enjoys its
vitality from the reaction to the failure of the global order. Events
in the months since the article appear only to underscore that
claim.
Rising
Economic Nationalism
President Trump has
substantially called the World Trade Organization (WTO) irrelevant to
US trade policies. But skepticism about the WTO precedes his
political rise as a nationalist. The once heralded WTO Doha (Doha
Development Agenda) was mired in dispute and ineffectiveness from its
inception in 2001 and especially after 2008. The annual number of WTO
trade disputes has more than doubled since 2008 even though trade
growth has been tepid (below global GDP growth for the last 3 years),
a sure sign of growing protectionist sentiments. The recent December
10-13 meeting of the WTO was largely a failure. “The trade body’s
164 members didn’t reach full consensus on any of the major
objectives it had set itself before the meeting,” in the words of
Bloomberg’s Bryce Baschuk and Charlie Devereux, with the EU
blaming failure on “destructive behavior by several large
countries.”
But the European Union
(EU) is itself enduring a burst of economic nationalism. While the
popular press and liberal pundits stress the role of xenophobia in
Brexit, the economic ills that fueled the growth of nationalism in
the UK vote against EU membership are largely neglected. Also, the
breadth of the rejection of open market policies throughout the EU
are largely missed.
A recent The Wall
Street Journal article (12-14-17) affirms my projections made in
2008 and 2009 for the EU:
The financial crisis that erupted in 2008 caused a drop in trade between EU countries, with little rebound since beyond precrisis levels. As Europe’s swoon dragged on, many politicians strove to prop up their economies with fixes that prioritized domestic markets over the EU. (The EU, a Disciple of Free Trade, is Erecting Barriers)
The WSJ author,
Valentina Pop, choses the example of Emmanuel Macron, the new French
President, to highlight the trend in the EU. Macron ran for office as
a passionate advocate for Europeanism and free markets. Nonetheless,
he nationalized a shipyard to block its purchase by an Italian firm,
he supports limiting foreign employment, and he “gutted” dairy
imports from EU countries. Further evidence for the retreat from
border-free markets and the embrace of nationalism comes from the
growth of trade barriers: legal actions against violators of the EU
market openness more than tripled last year.
Earlier this year, the
European commission moved legally against Romania and Hungary and, in
June, against Poland over economic disputes.
Nothing shows the fraying
of the one-global-market consensus and the turn to economic
nationalism more than the dispute escalating between the US and
Canada and waged though their corporate surrogates, Bombardier and
Boeing. Boeing lodged a complaint against Canadian aircraft firm
Bombardier with the US Commerce Department. With typical US
arrogance, Commerce slapped a 300% tariff on Bombardier planes sold
in the US.
Indignantly, the Canadian
government cancelled its plan to purchase $5.2 billion of new Boeing
fighters to supplement its existing Boeing fighter jets. Instead, it
will accept bids in 2019 for a purchase of 88 new fighters, but with
the pointed caveat that any bidder causing injury to Canada’s
interests would be disadvantaged, a not very subtle slap at Boeing.
Further, as Canada grows
increasingly unhappy with renegotiations over NAFTA, the government
has turned to the People's Republic of China (PRC) to craft an
alternative free-trade agreement (Canadian merchandise exports to the
PRC have more than doubled since 2007). Clearly, one of history’s
oldest and most intimate trading partnerships is under increasing
stress from economic nationalism.
Elsewhere,
I have demonstrated the qualitative changes in global energy markets,
along with the dramatic intensification of competition and associated
hostilities. The shifting energy alliances, the swings in market
share, and the political instabilities that are commonplace have
spurred the turn to economic nationalism.
What does
it Mean?
The
hasty conclusion that expansion of global markets along with
universal homage to a new global community constituted an
irreversible change in capitalist relations is now thoroughly
discredited by the realities of imperialist aggression and economic
crisis. In fact, the “globalization” moment coincided with the
vast inclusion of new economies – the former socialist community –
and the absolute hegemony of a capitalist power – the US. History
has known other moments, but theorists – including many on the left
– were too awed by capitalist triumphalism, drawn to knee jerk
anti-Communism, and desirous of facile answers to recognize this
continuity with the logic of state-monopoly capitalism. Well before
World War I, a similar moment occurred with the massive expansion of
markets under the global hegemony of the British Empire, a period
followed by economic decline spurring extreme nationalism.
As I stress in the above
passage,
written in 2009, the normal course of global economic relations in
the era of state monopoly capitalism is intense competition, pressure
on profitability, accumulation crises, rising nationalism, and
conflict. This is the norm in the age of imperialism. This is the
logic of late capitalism.
Appearances may suggest to
some a different narrative-- enduring prosperity in the mid-twentieth
century, peace guaranteed by economic internationalism at the turn of
the new century-- but the reality is different, far different.
Reality is imposed by crisis. And the upheaval of 2007-2008 exposed
the reality of fierce competition and national self-interest.
For some, the rise of
nationalism is strictly a political phenomenon anchored in demagogy
and ignorance; they see no linkage with the course of capitalism. But
the economic base for this phenomenon cannot be denied. Liberal
markets produced the crisis and the resulting human suffering sparked
a political response.
And ruling classes, faced
with pressure on profits from increasingly desperate and cut-throat
competition in the unprecedented slow-growth recovery, are inexorably
driven towards economic nationalism. While economic nationalism is a
natural fit with the far right’s ultra-patriotism, it attracts
centrist forces as well. Elements of the US trade union movement and
Democratic industrial state politicians have warmed to economic
nationalism since the days of bashing Japanese imports. Liberal
Senators like Sherrod Brown have quietly worked with President Trump
around overturning trade deals like NAFTA-- “strange
bedfellows” in the words of The Wall
Street Journal.
We do not have to press
the parallel too hard to recognize that the economic nationalism of
today threatens to spark disastrous wars, as did the rabid economic
nationalism of the European powers in the prelude to World War I (and
World War II). As in both eras, hostility and tensions are
smoldering. And as in that era, war promises to follow, with
devastation well beyond the comprehension of a complacent,
self-absorbed population. The threat of general war, nuclear war, is
possibly greater than any time in my lifetime, excepting the early
Cold War years of General Curtis “Dr. Strangelove” LeMay and the US
nuclear monopoly.
While extreme right
nationalism is a serious political danger, the rise of economic
nationalism, a growing policy consensus with capitalist rulers,
threatens the very existence of millions, if not the planet.
Greg Godels
zzsblogml@gmail.com